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H. Patrick Glenn* Capacity to Marry in the
Conflict of Laws: Some
Variations on a Theme
Problems of matrimonial capacity in the conflict of laws have
traditionally been said to be resolved through a distributive
application of the two personal laws in presence - to each his or
her own law.' Yet the proponents of this "dual domicile doctrine"
have met strong opposition from those who would recognize a
paramount interest on the part of the State wherein the marriage is to
be fixed, rather than that from which the parties may have come, in
determining its validity. Savigny in Germany, 2 Bartin in France, 3
Cook in the U.S.A., 4 and Cheshire5 in England have most
vigorously advanced the case for application of the law of the
intended matrimonal home, but they have been far from alone in
advancing such arguments. 6 Two recent decisions moreover - one
*H. Patrick Glenn, Associate Professor of Law, McGill University
1. The tradition is that of Commonwealth jurisdictions over the last century and of
most Continental European States, the latter defining the personal law in terms of
nationality. Problems do arise, however, with respect to prohibitions formulated
expressly or impliedly in terms of the characteristics of the other spouse. See text,
infra, at . Exceptions to the basic rule also exist. See A. V. Dicey and J. H.
C. Morris, The Conflict ofLaivs (9th ed. London: Stevens and Sons, 1973) Rule 34
[hereinafter "Dicey and Morris"]
2. F. Savigny, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, trans. W. Guthrie (1st ed.
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1869) at 240 (expressed in terms of a presumption in
favour of the husband's domicile)
3. 2 Bartin, Principes de droit international privg (Paris: Domat-Montchrestien,
1932) at 123 (in principle, the husband's personal law which, in the Continental
perspective, is the husband's national law. For a decision in this sense, see Trib.
Montpellier, Arnero March 18, 1920, S. 1921. 2. 11, Clunet 1920. 633)
4. W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1942) at 447-48
5. G. Cheshire, Private International Law (7th ed. London: Butterworths, 1965) at
276ff.
6. See, e.g., though in some cases with modifications, C. Schmitthoff, The
English Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1954) at 312-13; E. Sykes, The Essential
Validity of Marriage (1955), 4 I.C.L.Q. 159 at 168; P. Maddaugh, Validity of
Marriage and the Conflict of Laws (1973), 23 U.T.L.J. 117 at 136; B. Audit, La
Fraude b la loi (Paris: Dalloz, 1974) at 35, 284 (who considers the interest of the
law of the matrimonial domicile to become increasingly dominant as the years pass
after celebration of the marriage). Recent formulations of both United States and
German law on this subject admit the relevance of changes of domicile or
nationality after celebration of the marriage (Statutenwechsel), without limiting the
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from England 7 and one from Ontario 8 - have provided further
support for their theories. The purpose of this note is not to restate
well known arguments in favour of either position but rather to
explore briefly a possible via media between the two. The thesis to
be defended is that what have been seen generally as competing and
contradictory theories may in fact be able to work together in some
harmony, permitting effective recognition of the interests involved
without creating intolerable conditions of uncertainty.
Essential to the proposition to be advanced is the idea that there
are circumstances in which it is clear that the parties, on marrying,
have deliberately and clearly severed themselves from previous
jurisdictional attachments. The clearest case is the marriage
celebrated to facilitate the departure of both persons from a
jurisdiction hostile to them, followed by fixed and permanent
settlement elsewhere. Less radical but still easily discernible efforts
to "'begin a new life" are frequent. In all such cases the argument
has regularly and, it is felt, convincingly been made that it is
artificial and improper to make application of a law or laws which
have never had and are unlikely to have any real connection with the
marriage. 9 In such cases the jurisdiction whose laws are most
competent to pronounce on the validity of the marriage is that in
which the matrimonial home is established and in which the parties
live as man and wife.
The major obstacle to adoption of the theory of the intended
matrimonial home, which would adequately respond to these
situations as well as to the more frequent one of the parties simply.
settling in an existing domicile, has been uncertainty as to its
application in a number of perhaps statistically insignificant but
easily envisaged situations. The theory is thought of generally as
requiring application of the law of the intended matrimonial home.
What if the parties have no such intention? What if the intention is
discussion to changes from pre-existing personal laws to those first acquired after
celebration. The American Law Institute, 2 Restatement 2nd Conflict of Laws (St.
Paul: A.L.I. Publishers, 1971) s. 283 at 240; 3 Staudingers Kommentar zum
Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch, E.G.B.G.B., (10th & 11th ed. Berlin: J. Schweitzer
Verlog, 1973) at 201-10, 345-46 [hereinafter "Staudingers Kommentar" ]. See
also infra, note 26
7. Radwan v. Radwan (No. 2), [1973] Fam. 35; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 939; [1972] 3
All E.R. 1026
8. Feiner v. Demkowicz (1973), 2 O.R. (2d) 121; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 165; 14 R.F.L.
27 (H.C.)
9. See the writers cited supra, notes 2-6
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unfulfilled at the time of litigation? In response to these questions,
and admitting the force of the argument that status cannot be
affected by intention or will alone, as perhaps in the case of
contract, advocates of the intended matrimonial home theory agree
that the intention must be fulfilled if the law of that jurisdiction is to
apply. Absent such intention, or absent fulfillment of it, we are told
to rely simply on the law of the husband's domicile at the time of
celebration, as being the jurisdiction wherein marriages generally
come to be located. 10 To the criticism of uncertainty is now added,
with great force in to-day's world, that of sexual discrimination."
What therefore seems required is a non-discriminatory, realistic,
alternative solution for the case in which, at the time of litigation, it
is not clear that the parties have clearly severed their marriage from
their pre-existing personal laws. Such a solution, it is suggested, is
to be found in the dual domicile theory itself, application of which is
perfectly justifiable in all cases in which the actual interest of States
to control the marriages of their domiciliaries has not been displaced
through a clear localization of the marriage elsewhere. Capacity to
marry should therefore be governed by the law of the first common
domicile established after celebration of the marriage or, failing
such domicile, by the personal law of each party at the time of
celebration of the marriage.
This formulation, it is realized, places less emphasis on the
intention of the parties at the time of marriage but, if one accepts
that status cannot be affected by intention alone, it is difficult to see
how such intention acquired the importance it did in the usual
formulations of the theory of the matrimonial home. If the parties
had decided, at the time of celebration, to live elsewhere, this would
certainly be an element in deciding against the application of the law
of the husband's domicile (as the presumptive matrimonial home),
but an element of very considerably less importance that the fact
that they actually did go and live elsewhere. It is the actual situs of
the marriage which is fundamental, not the preliminary musings of
the parties to it. Thus, if there is no clear proof as to pre-existing
intention, this should not, it is felt, prevent application of the law of
the place where the parties do in fact settle. Or if the intention
changes at the time of celebration or immediately thereafter,
10. Supra, notes 2-5
11. See Dicey and Morris, supra, note 1 at 261; G. Cheshire and P. North, Private
International Law (9th ed. London: Butterworths, 1974) at 339
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execution of the new intention should outweigh the importance of
that which has been abandoned. ' 2
How would such a rule operate in the marginal cases wherein the
theory of the intended matrimonial home has been criticized? If the
challenge to a party's capacity to marry should intervene prior to the
celebration or prior to establishment of the matrimonial home -
either because its establishment was delayed by a long
honeymoon,1 3 or because the marriage simply dissolved prior to its
establishment 14 - the existing personal laws, not having been
clearly displaced, would continue to receive distributive applicat-
ion. Only in the case where, at the moment of adjudication, it could
be clearly established that a breaking away from previous
attachments had taken place, would the law of the new matrimonial
home receive application.
Three patterns for the establishment of a matrimonial home are
evident. The first is that in which the pre-existing domiciles are
different, and the matrimonial home is established in one or the
other of them. She follows him or he follows her. An example of
such a case is Radwan v. Radwan (No. 2) 15 in which, the parties
having intended to establish and having in fact established the
matrimonial home in the husband's domicile by the time of
litigation, Cumming-Bruce J. applied the law of that jurisdiction to
the problem of the wife's capacity to enter into a polygamous
marriage, and upheld the marriage. The same case also indicates the
clear likelihood of the reverse pattern - the parties establishing
themselves in the state of the wife's pre-existing domicile - since
the parties did eventually re-establish their domicile in England, the
place of the wife's pre-existing domicile.
Again, it may be the case that the pre-existing domiciles are
different and that the parties choose to establish themselves in a
third, new state. Or, finally, it may be that there is an existing
common domicile but that the parties have decided to abandon that
12. See, to this effect, Maddaugh, supra, note 6 at 136
13. As inRadivan v. Radwan (No. 2), [1973] Fain. 35 at 40; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 939
at 941; [1972] 3 All E.R. 1026 at 1029
14. For such a mariage iclair, see Zoldester v. Zoldester (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d)
316; [1974] 2 W.W.R. 572; 13 R.F.L. 398 (B.C. S.C., T.D.). Early dissolution
could also be caused by death shortly after celebration or even by death before
celebration, in the event of a posthumous marriage, as in the Belgian decision of
the Trib. civil d'Arlon, January 16, 1973, Revue critique de droit international
priv6 1974. 322
15. [1973] Fam. 35; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 939; [1972]3 All E.R. 1026
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state in favour of another, usually a country of immigration. Such
was the pattern of fact in the recent Ontario case of Feiner v.
Demkowicz. 16 The parties, aunt and nephew, were both domiciled
in Poland and went through a form of marriage in Poland in order to
facilitate the aunt's departure from the country. It was the intention
of the parties to establish themselves in Canada as soon as they
could emigrate, and they did subsequently so establish themselves,
in Ontario. Aunt-nephew marriages being within the prohibited
degrees of Ontario law, Madam Justice Van Camp annulled the
marriage on that ground. She did so, however, not by expressly
adopting the theory of the intended matrimonial home - though
stating that ". . . if this theory is valid, it would apply to the parties
to this action"' 17 - but rather by deciding that there had been
insufficient evidence of contrary dispositions of Polish law and by
applying the presumption - admitted to be criticized - that in the
absence of adequate proof foreign law shall be presumed to be the
same as that of the forum.18 The proof offered was in fact
deficient,' 9 and it is unfortunate that better proof was not made
available to the court. Polish law does apparently admit the validity
of such marriages - limiting to a strict minimum causes of nullity
based on consanguinity or defective consent 20 - and such proof
would, it is felt, have led to a clearer articulation of the grounds for
the decision, which appears correct in the end result.2' The law
16. (1973), 2 O.R. (2d) 121; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 165; 14 R.F.L. 27
17. Van Camp J. also formulated the theory of Professor Cheshire (that of the
intended matrimonial home) as involving a presumption that capacity is governed
by the domiciliary law of the parties at the time of celebration, which could be
rebutted by proof of intention to establish the home in a certain country, and
establishment in fact in that country; Feiner v. Demkowicz (1973), 2 O.R. (2d) 121
at 126; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 165 at 170; 14 R.F.L. 27 at 32. This is in fact not the theory
of Professor Cheshire but rather, the problem of intention aside, that which is being
suggested in this note.
18. Further grounds of nullity relating to non-consummation and lack of consent
were rejected. See the critical comment by F. Bates (1975), 53 Can. B. Rev. 359
19. It consisted only of evidence of the ceremony itself, a statement of the plaintiff
that it was correct in Polish law, and "what purported to be translations of what
was alleged to be part of the Polish marriage code" (Feiner v. Demkolvicz (1973),
2 O.R. (2d) 121 at 127; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 165 at 171; 14 R.F.L. 27 at 33)
20. . Szer, "Droit de la famille" in S. Rozmaryn, ed., Introduction b l'dtude du
droit polonais (Warsaw, 1967) at 182-87; D. Lasok, Polish Family Law (Leyden:
A. W. Sijthoff, 1968) at 45-59
21. To say this is not necessarily to deny the utility of a presumption in favour of
the validity of marriages, as to which see A. Ehrenzweig and E. Jayme, 2 Private
International Law (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1973) at 150-52;
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applied was that of the jurisdiction wherein the parties intended to
settle, and did settle, after the marriage was celebrated.
The existence of such different rules for different situations is,
moreover, likely to result in a simplification, rather than in a
complication, of the existing law. For in the measure that the law of
a single jurisdiction comes to replace two previously existing
personal laws, the difficult problem of the precise sphere of
application of those laws will be avoided. Civilian lawyers would
no longer need to enquire whether a prohibition was unilateral or
bilateral, i.e., intended to contemplate only the spouse whose law
contained it, or the other spouse as well. 22 Common law lawyers
could avoid the problem of explaining decisions such as Pugh v.
Pugh, 23 in which H and W, both of whom satisfied the conditions
for marriage stipulated in their respective personal laws, were found
incapable of marrying since W failed to meet the conditions of H's
law. Given that it is the single law of the matrimonial home which
applies, much present uncertainty as to the reach of the respective
personal laws will have been removed.
24
One further objection to this theory of the established
matrimonial home should, however, be noted. It is of the slippery
slope or thin-edge-of-the-wedge variety, to the effect that
recognizing the role of the matrimonial home must also lead,
intolerably, to recognition of a similar role for the law of all
subsequently established matrimonial homes. Since marriages
cannot be on-again, off-again institutions, any resort to other than
Staudingers Konmnentar, supra, note 6; J. Swan, A New Approach to Marriage and
Divorce in the Conflicts of Laws (1974), 24 U.T.L.J. 17. Marriage remains,
however, in the language of the American Restatement (2 Restatement 2d Conflict
of Laws s. 283 at 234), a "matter of intense public concern" and this in itself will
often suffice to rebut such a presumption, particularly where, as in Feiner v.
Demkowicz (1973), 2 O.R. (2d) 121; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 165; 14 R.F.L. 27, the
relation has dissolved defacto and there is considerable doubt as to the expectations
of the parties at the time of celebration.
22. See generally H. Batiffol and P. Lagarde, 2 Droit International Privi (6th ed.
Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1976) at 37, who suggest that a law prohibiting the
marriage of persons afflicted with certain illnesses should apply bilaterally, i.e. to
invalidate the marriage of a healthy ressortissant of the enacting state to an afflicted
foreigner.
23. [1951] P.482;[1951]12AllE.R.680
24. It is perhaps justifiable to recall the concluding remark of Cumming-Bruce J.
inRadwan v. Radiwan (No. 2), [1973] Fam. 35 at 54; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 939 at 954;
[1972] 3 All E.R. 1026 at 1040: "Having had the benefit of argument, I do not
think that this branch of the law relating to capacity for marriage is quite as tidy as
some very learned authors would have me believe. .... "
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pre-existing personal laws must therefore be excluded. 25 Interes-
tingly, there have been decisions adopting the attitude that
matrimonial capacity is tested by the personal law of the parties at
the time of litigation 26 but this view, though it is generally accepted
in determining the effects of marriage, does, it is felt, add an
element of uncertainty which is undesirable. The conclusion does
not follow, however, that the only remaining possibility is
application of pre-existing personal laws. The circumstances of the
case may point to application of the law of the established
matrimonial home, but the requirements of security and certainty of
legal relations are sufficient to reject the granting of any such role to
after-acquired domiciles. The law of the first established domicile,
and it alone, should govern. The most striking analogy is with the
law of matrimonial regimes, recognized in many jurisdictions to be
that of the matrimonial home, and unaffected by subsequent
changes of domicile.27 In English law, moreover, the case of
Radwan v. Radwan28 must be taken as authority for the rejection of
the law of later-acquired domiciles, since there was no question
therein of application of English law or the law of an after-acquired
domicile.
Nor is it felt that there is any problem which arises from the fact
that, with the solution here proposed, the validity of the marriage
may be seen, erroneously, to be governed initially by pre-existing
25. J. H. C. Morris, The Conflict of Laws (London: Stevens & Sons, 1971) at 98
26. See the decision of the German Reichsgericht (Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen, vol. 132. p. 416 - religious prohibition of Austrian
law not applied to marriage in Russia of Austrian male and Russian female who
four years later acquired Italian nationality) cited by Professor W. Wengler in his
comment on Schwebel v. Ungar, [19653 S.C.R. 148; 48 D.L.R. (2d) 644 in
(1965), 54 Revue critique de droit international priv6 32 1; and the Quebec decision
in Varju v. Juhasz, [1964] C.S. 636. The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Schwebel v. Ungar also indicates a willingness to permit the validity of acts
affecting status (here divorce) to be determined by an after-acquired domicile, at
least where the validity of the act is an incidental question in the resolution of a
primary question governed by the law of the after-acquired domicile. Of interest in
a related area are recent German decisions admitting the formal validity of
marriages invalid by the lex loci celebrationis but formally valid by the law of a
subsequently acquired nationality of the parties. See Staudingers Kommentar,
supra, note 6 at 346. The results appear to correspond with the recommendations of
Professor Maddaugh in matters of form; supra, note 6 at 139, 146
27. See Dicey and Morris, supra, note I at 647. There is English authority,
moreover, for allowing the matrimonial regime to vary with changes of domicile
(see Dicey and Morris, supra, note I at 647), but such flexibility seems
inappropriate when the existence of the marriage is in question.
28. [1973] Fam. 35; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 939; [1972] 3 All E.R. 1026
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personal laws and then, after fixing of the matrimonial domicile, by
the law of that jurisdiction. Once the matrimonial home is fixed, its
law will control the validity of the marriage as from its inception. If
no such matrimonial home is established, e.g. because of the death
of the parties or the prior de facto dissolution of the union, the
personal laws remain operative. 29 Only in the rarest of cases, where
adjudication was first necessary before the matrimonial home
became fixed, can one envisage the possibility of different
conclusions being reached as to the validity of the marriage. Such
problems, and they are not absent in the traditional dual domicile
theory, must simply be resolved through application of general
principles of res judicata and the recognition of foreign
judgments. 30
29. See, to this effect, C. Schmitthoff, supra, note 6 at 314
30. The Ontario Law Reform Commission has indicated the dangers of a volteface
with the traditional approach. See Ontario Law Reform Commission, 7 Family Law
Project Study (Toronto: 1968) at 354, where the example is given of a marriage
valid when celebrated according to Ontario choice of law rules but which is later
annulled by a competent foreign court applying a different choice of law rule. The
judgment should be recognized, according to normal rules of recognition of foreign
judgments, but is one to reject today that which one yesterday accepted? Here the
problem of the possible volteface flows from the intervention of a foreign court
applying a different choice of law rule. With the theory being advanced in this note
the problem could also flow from the forum's rule pointing to different jurisdictions
depending upon the time of adjudication. In general, for purposes of legal certainty
and the maintenance of the binding force of judgments, any prior adjudication
fixing the status of the parties should be entitled to respect, whether the judgment
be that of the forum or a competent foreign court. If the forum or a competent
foreign court, prior to establishment of the matrimonial domicile, annuls or
validates the marriage on the basis of pre-existing personal laws, this decision
should be entitled to respect; nor does it generally appear appropriate to make use
of the notion of a marriage valid "as far as yet appears" (See the Duchess of
Kingston's Case (1776), 2 Smith, L.C. (13th ed.) 644 (H.L.); G. Spencer Bower
and A. Turner, The Doctrine ofRes Judicata (2nd ed. London: Butterworths, 1969)
at 169-70), or "conditionally invalid" (See H. Hubbard, "Res Judicata in
Matrimonial Causes" in 2 D. Mendes da Costa, ed., Studies in Canadian Family
Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972) 695 at 735ff.) On the other hand, decisions
which simply authorize or refuse celebration appear of lesser consequence. A
foreign decision refusing or authorizing celebration may be based on considerations
other than that of the capacity of the parties and such decisions should best be seen
as limited to the act of celebration, without any necessary implication for the
validity of the marriage. Nor should a previous refusal of the courts of the forum to
authorize celebration of the marriage in the forum be seen as necessarily implying
the invalidity of a marriage subsequently celebrated elsewhere. Where, however,
the courts of the forum have previously authorized celebration in the forum on the
basis of capacity by pre-existing personal laws, subsequent settlement in a
jurisdiction hostile to the marriage should not it is felt, invalidate that which has
been expressly authorized.
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Conclusion
Marriage is meant to be an enduring legal relationship. Yet a choice
of law rule which rigidly refers the validity of marriage to the
personal laws of the parties prior to celebration is one which totally
ignores this temporal dimension of the institution, as well as any
geographic mobility of the parties. Where the parties have in effect
abandoned their pre-existing personal laws, and where this
abandonment has become certain through the passage of time, our
choice of law rules should reflect this very important circumstance.
Adoption of the theory of the established matrimonial home will
allow the discarding of abandoned personal laws, once this has
become clearly established, without creating the uncertainty
attendant on the creation of "non-rules" or a rule allowing the
existence of the marriage to vary with each change of domicile.
